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PRE-JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 13(a)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) requires resolution of re-
lated claims between the same parties in a single lawsuit,1 but it
does not specify how the courts are to enforce this policy. Typically,
Rule 13(a) operates after judgment to bar a second suit based on a
claim that should have been pleaded as a compuliory counterclaim
in the initial suit.2 However, neither Rule 13(a), nor its Advisory
Committee's Notes, provide an explanation of the pre-judgment
consequences of a party's failure to comply. 3 As a result, the courts
continue to display confusion and inconsistency as to what proce-
dure a court should follow when a defendant in a federal suit fails to
state a compulsory counterclaim in the initial action but brings a
separate suit on the claim, in federal or state court, subsequent to
the commencement of the first action but prior to judgment in that
action.4
This Note addresses the efforts of the courts to advance the pol-
icies of Rule 13(a) and proposes a consistent pre-judgment proce-
dure for the courts to follow when a party fails to comply with the
Rule. Part I summarizes the purpose behind Rule 13(a). Part II
1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) states in full:
Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the
time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another
pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by
attachment or other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdic-
tion to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not
stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13.
FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a).
2 See cases discussed infra note 9.
3 The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 13(a) address only the post-judgment
consequences, stating that "[i]f the action proceeds to judgment without the interposi-
tion of a counterclaim as required by [the rule], the counterclaim is barred." FED. R.
Civ. P. 13(a) advisory committee's note 7.
4 Wright and Miller summarize the problem as follows:
Although it is well established that a party is barred from suing on a claim
that should have been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim in a prior
action, one closely related question remains unsettled. What would pre-
vent a party who does not want to assert his claim as a compulsory coun-
terclaim in a suit instituted by his opponent from bringing an
independent action on that claim while the first action is pending?
6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1418, at 103 (Ist ed.
1971) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER].
analyzes how the courts effectuate this purpose when the defendant
brings his independent suit in another federal court. Part III deals
with the situation in which the defendant brings his independent
action in a state court. Each part first analyzes the various current
approaches of the courts and then attempts to propose a consistent
approach that advances the purposes of Rule 13(a) without unduly
sacrificing fairness to the parties.
Part II concludes that the two federal courts should cooperate
and use various procedural devices at their disposal including in-
terdistrict transfer and interdistrict injunctions to consolidate the
two actions. Before either court takes steps toward consolidation of
the claims, however, the initial court obtaining jurisdiction over the
parties should balance certain competing interests to resolve which
of the two courts is the more appropriate forum for the action. Part
III concludes that the concerns behind Rule 13(a) will generally be
outweighed by the interest in allowing claimants access to an in-
dependent state judicial system, but that in certain situations, a state
court should abate its action so as to effectuate the Rule's purpose.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Purpose of the Rule: Preventing Repetitive Litigation
The essential purpose behind the compulsory counterclaim
rule is to prevent repetitive litigation and the resulting waste ofjudi-
cial resources. 5 As the Supreme Court has stated:
The requirement that counterclaims arising out of the same trans-
action or occurrence as the opposing party's claim "shall" be
stated in the pleadings was designed to prevent multiplicity of ac-
tions and to achieve resolution in a single lawsuit of all disputes
arising out of common matters. The Rule was particularly di-
rected against one who failed to assert a counterclaim in one ac-
tion and then instituted a second action in which that
counterclaim became the basis of the complaint.6
Thus, courts treat the Rule as generally requiring the resolution of
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, and be-
tween the same parties, in a single lawsuit. For example, in United
States v. Eastport Steamship Corp.,7 the court declared that "[t]he un-
derlying purpose of the rule is to force disposition in one action of
5 See, e.g., id. at § 1409, at 37 ("The reason for compelling the litigant to interpose
compulsory counterclaims is to enable the court to settle all related claims in one action,
thereby avoiding a wasteful multiplicity of litigation on claims arising from a single
transaction or occurrence.").
6 Southern Constr. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 60 (1962) (per curiam).
7 255 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958).
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all claims which have arisen between the parties to that litigation."
B. Defining the Problem: Limiting Rule 13(a) Application to
Post-Judgment Proceedings
Some courts interpret Rule 13(a) as having no effect until a
judgment is rendered in the initial action. For example, in Bellmore
Sales Corp. v. Winfield Drug Stores, Inc.,9 the court allowed the plaintiff,
Bellmore, to adjudicate a claim that should have been asserted as a
compulsory counterclaim in a suit pending in another federal court.
Bellmore's claim arose out of the same transaction as Winfield's
claim, pending in the prior action. Winfield moved for dismissal on
the grounds that Rule 13(a) required that Bellmore assert its claim
as a compulsory counterclaim in the prior pending action. 10 Relying
on the language of Advisory Committee's Note 7,11 the court held
that "[ilt is only after [the] action proceeds to judgment that any
compulsory counterclaim . . . will be barred." 12 Because the first
action was still pending, the court denied the motion.13
The Bellmore approach has a number of shortcomings, the fore-
most of which is that it frustrates the efficiency goal of Rule 13(a).14
As stated by the Supreme Court, the Rule "was designed to prevent
multiplicity of actions and to achieve resolution in a single lawsuit of
all disputes arising out of common matters."' 15 The Bellmore rule al-
lows a party to pursue an independent action on a compulsory coun-
terclaim whenever he can get to the second courthouse before the
8 Id. at 805. The policy interest in preventing duplicative litigation is not confined
to the compulsory counterclaim situation. For example, similar problems arise when the
same plaintiff brings the same claim against the same defendant in more than one court.
Another closely analogous situation arises when a claimant seeks relief in one court,
while his opponent seeks a declaratory judgment resolving his liability on that claim in
another court. What is unique about the counterclaim situation is that, in addition to
sound policy favoring consolidation of the claims, failure to consolidate generally in-
volves violating a federal rule. This Note focuses on this latter situation.
9 187 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also ACF Indus., Inc. v. Hecht, 284 F.
Supp. 572, 574 (D. Kan. 1967) (Rule 13(a) "defense does not arise until after the other
action has proceeded to judgment"); Local 499, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Iowa
Power & Light, 224 F. Supp. 731, 738 (S.D. Iowa 1964) ("A plaintiff's claim should not
be dismissed on ground that it should have been raised as a compulsory counterclaim in
a prior action, where such prior action is still pending and has not proceeded to judg-
ment."). The more recent cases indicate that this approach is no longer followed. See,
e.g., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. v. Los Angeles County, 542 F. Supp. 1317
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (dismissing suit brought on a claim that was subject to the compulsory
counterclaim rule in a pending suit). For a more complete discussion, see infra note 26
and accompanying text.
10 187 F. Supp. at 162.
11 See supra note 3.
12 187 F. Supp. at 162.
13 Id.
14 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
15 Southern Constr. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 60 (1962) (per curiam).
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first court renders its judgment. If the second court reaches ajudg-
ment before the .first court, the party bringing that second action
will have effectively circumvented the Rule.16 Since the contempo-
raneous lawsuits often involve related and even identical issues, as
well as the same basic facts and witnesses, the Bellmore approach pro-
duces the wasteful, duplicative litigation that the Rule was intended
to eliminate.1 7
Moreover, the Bellmore rule encourages disruptive races to liti-
gation as each party attempts to have its chosen court render the
first judgment.18 Under the Belmore court's interpretation of Rule
13(a), a judgment in the first action requires the second court to
dismiss. Thus, the plaintiff in each action will try to expedite the
proceedings, while the defendant in each action will try to delay.
The incentive to rush may hamper the plaintiffs' ability to give suffi-
cient attention to aspects of the suit such as discovery, thereby de-
creasing the possibility of a full and fair trial. Meanwhile, the
incentive to delay may produce frivolous motions which waste the
courts' and the parties' time and resources.
In most cases, the doctrine of issue preclusion 19 will apply,
making a judgment in either action conclusive as to the issues con-
cerning the claim in the other action. This possibility will reinforce
the incentives for each party to expedite the proceedings on his own
claim, while using delay tactics in the proceedings concerning the
opposing party's claim. By contrast, where issue preclusion does
not apply,20 the Bellmore rule produces a race to the courthouse, as
16 See, e.g., Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IowA L. REv. 11, 13 n.14 (1961) (Limiting
the effect of the Rule to post-judgment bar would mean "that the original defendant can
bring his reactive suit and, if he can get a judgment before the judgment in the initial
action, the compulsory counterclaim provision is meaningless to him.").
17 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 626 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (avoiding duplicative suits serves economic interests as well as "eliminating
the risk of inconsistent adjudications and races to obtain judgments"); ACF Indus. v.
Guinn, 384 F.2d 15, 19 (5th Cir. 1967) (allowing the two duplicative suits to go forward
would produce "an unwanted and highly undesirable race by each party to obtain a
decision from the particular district court reacting most favorably to its position"). Pro-
fessor Vestal describes concurrent suits between the same parties, but in reversed posi-
tions, concerning the same factual controversy, as "reactive litigation." Vestal, supra
note 16, at 11. He argues that "[t]here is a real danger that there will be an unseemly
race to litigate where reactive litigation is pending." Id. at 16.
19 Issue preclusion prevents a party from relitigating any issue that has been con-
clusively adjudicated in a prior action that has reached judgment. "Ajudgment in favor
of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in a subsequent action between
them on the same or a different claim, with respect to any issue actually litigated and
determined if its determination was essential to that judgment." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OFJUDGMENTS § 17(3) (1980).
20 Issue preclusion does not apply when two claims, though arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence, do not involve precisely the same issues. Id.
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well as a race to judgment, because the party initiating the first ac-
tion can avail himself of Rule 13(a)'s explicit exception for pending
claims.2 1 In that situation, ajudgment in the first action invokes the
Rule 13(a) bar, thereby disposing of the claim in the second action.
Ajudgment in the second action, however, does not affect the claim
in the first action because Rule 13(a) does not apply to this previ-
ously pending claim. The resulting race to the courthouse may
cause the parties to litigate the suit prematurely, at a time that is
inconvenient to the parties and witnesses. 22
The Bellmore court relied on the language of the Advisory Com-
mittee's Note23 to support its position that Rule 13(a) acts as a bar
only after judgment. The Note, however, does not state that the
Rule shall have no effect prior to judgment; it merely states that a
compulsory counterclaim is barred if not asserted prior to judg-
ment. Arguably, this language might indicate by negative implica-
tion that the drafters did not intend the Rule to have any pre-
judgment effect. But such an argument fails to justify an interpreta-
tion that directly conflicts with the Rule's purpose. The Rule's effi-
ciency purpose dictates that the Rule have a pre-judgment effect, so
as to avert duplicative litigation.24 Furthermore, Rule 1 of the Fed-
eral Rules requires the courts to construe the rules so as to advance
faimess. 25 By permitting simultaneous proceedings in two courts
concerning substantially identical issues and by creating a situation
in that the party who wins the race to judgment chooses the forum
which ultimately resolves both parties' claims, the Bellmore approach
advances neither fairness nor efficiency. 26
C. Second Action in Same Federal Court: Consolidation
Under Rule 42(a)
Bellmore demonstrates the inadequacies of limiting the applica-
tion of Rule 13(a)'s bar to post-judgment cases. However, allowing
21 "But the pleader need not state the claim if... at the time the action was com-
menced the claim was the subject of another pending action .. " FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
22 See also Vestal, supra note 16, at 16-17 ("The pressure of the race to litigate is
especially great in some jurisdictions with compulsory counterclaim provisions.").
23 See supra note 3.
24 See supra notes 5-8, 15-17 and accompanying text.
25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 states, in part, that "[t]hese rules... shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added).
26 Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of courts have rejected this ap-
proach, as the cases discussed throughout the remainder of this Note will make clear.
Thus, the difficulty becomes not whether to consolidate the two pending actions, but in
what manner to do so. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Cook, 106 F.R.D. 238, 239 (D.D.C. 1985)
("Since it is clear that the complaint in this action should have been pleaded as a com-
pulsory counterclaim .... the remaining question is how to go about consolidating the
separate proceedings.").
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the Rule to take effect prior to judgment in the first action raises the
question of how the two courts with jurisdiction over the parties
should effectuate the Rule's efficiency goal. When the initial de-
fendant brings his suit in the same federal court as the initial plain-
tiff, the court can achieve the goals of Rule 13(a) by simply
consolidating the two actions pursuant to Rule 42(a).27
In Speed Products Co. v. Tinnerman Products, Inc.2S the court af-
firmed the district court's decision to consolidate two related suits,
rather than dismissing the later-filed claim which should have been
asserted as a compulsory counterclaim in the prior suit. Speed sued
Tinnerman in federal court and Tinnerman counterclaimed. After
the initial decision in that action was reversed, and when a remand
was pending, Speed brought a separate action-based on a claim
that arose out of the same transaction as Tinnerman's counterclaim
in the first suit-in the same federal district court. The district court
then consolidated the two actions pursuant to Rule 42(a). On ap-
peal, the court observed that "under Rule 13(a) . . .the claim of
Speed's second action was subject-matter for a compulsory counter-
claim. To avoid the bar of res judicata in a subsequent action,
Speed was obliged to plead it in the first action before Tinnerman's
counterclaim had been finally adjudicated." 29 The court reasoned
that because Speed brought its second action during the period in
which it could have amended its complaint in the first action, and
because the district court consolidated the two suits, the failure to
follow the Rule had no practical consequence. Accordingly, the
court held that Speed's second claim was not barred.30
II
SECOND SUIT BROUGHT IN ANOTHER FEDERAL COURT:
CONSOLIDATION OF CLAIMS BY TRANSFER OR
INTERDISTRICT INJUNCTION
The more difficult case arises when the defendant in the initial
27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) states:
Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any
or all of the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
28 222 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1955).
29 Id. at 68 (citations omitted). Although Speed was the plaintiff, rather than the
defendant, in the original action, it was nonetheless required to assert this claim as a
counterclaim in the initial action. Rule 13(a) requires a plaintiff to assert any claims
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the defendant's counterclaims be-
cause the compulsory counterclaim requirement of the Rule applies to any "pleading."
See supra note 1.
30 222 F.2d at 68.
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suit fails to assert his compulsory counterclaim and, while that suit is
pending, brings an independent action on his claim in another dis-
trict.3 ' Because two district courts have jurisdiction over the parties,
Rule 42(a)32 is not available. As a result, "consolidation" 3 3 of the
two actions requires judicial mechanisms that have an interdistrict
effect.
A. The First-Filed Priority Rule
1. The Basic Rule
Most courts facing this situation rely on a general rule that the
first court to obtain jurisdiction of a lawsuit has priority over any
subsequent suits involving the same parties and related claims.3 4 In
Crosely Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp.,35 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit set forth the rationale for the first-filed priority
rule:
It is of obvious importance to all the litigants to have a single de-
termination of their controversy, rather than several decisions
which if they conflict may require separate appeals to different cir-
cuit courts of appeals. No party has a vested right to have his
cause tried by one judge rather than by another of equal jurisdic-
tion.... The party who first brings a controversy into a court of
competent jurisdiction for adjudication should, so far as our dual
system permits, be free from the vexation of subsequent litigation
over the same subject matter. The economic waste involved in
duplicating litigation is obvious. 36
31 Several factors may motivate a party to file an independent action in another
district, including seeking a more geographically convenient forum, a forum having
judges and local rules with which the party is familiar and comfortable, a forum that the
party anticipates will apply more favorable law, or even a forum which will render the
opposing party's defense more difficult. For a summary of these and other motivating
factors, see Vestal, supra note 16, at 13-15.
32 See supra note 27.
33 Although the term "consolidation" is often considered synonymous with "con-
solidation under Rule 42(a)," it can also refer, in a more general sense, to combining
claims into one lawsuit. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Cook, 106 F.R.D. 238, 240 (D.D.C. 1985)
("dismissal of this action offers the most effective way to consolidate the separate aspects
of this dispute"). This Note uses the term in this latter, generic sense except when ex-
plicitly referring to Rule 42(a).
34 For example, in Donaldson, Lufin &Jenrette, Inc. v. Los Angeles County, 542
F. Supp. 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court noted that "the accepted rule.., is that the
forum where an action is filed first is accorded priority over subsequent actions arising
out of the facts giving rise to the first filed action." Id. at 1320. See also General Battery
Corp. v. TSS-Seedman's, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 488, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("It is a well settled
principle ... that 'when there is more than one lawsuit involving the same parties and
the same issues, pending in different courts, the court first obtaining jurisdiction of the
parties and the issues should proceed with the litigation.' ") (citations omitted).
35 122 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1941).
36 Id. at 930.
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Applying this rule to the compulsory counterclaim situation,
many courts assume that Rule 13(a) requires that the "single law-
suit" resolving the related claims must occur in the court first ob-
taining jurisdiction over the parties. Thus, in United States v. Eastport
Steamship, Corp. ,37 a case involving the Court of Claims equivalent of
Rule 13(a), the court ruled that "[tlhe compulsory counterclaim rule
requires that once the action was commenced in the Court of Claims
that court was the only proper forum for the adjudication of any
[compulsory counterclaims]. "38 Similarly, in Semmes Motors, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co.,39 the court noted that "the instances where the sec-
ond court should go forward despite the protests of a party to the
first action where full justice can be done, should be rare indeed." 40
2. Possible Departure From the Rule
A number of courts, however, have argued against mechanical
application of the first-filed priority rule.41 The most notable case
to question the first-filed priority rule is Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Secur-
ity National Bank.42 In Columbia, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals reversed the district court and held that the plaintiff in the
court first acquiring jurisidiction was entitled to an injunction
preventing the defendant from prosecuting in a later filed action.43
The court issued the injunction, however, only after determining
which of the two forums was more appropriate to hear the action.
The case came to the court of appeals in a somewhat unusual
procedural posture. Columbia had first sued Security in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. A week later, Se-
curity brought suit against Columbia in a New York state court. Co-
lumbia removed Security's action to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York and then amended its com-
plaint in the District of Columbia action to include a claim arising
out of the same transaction as Security's now pending claim in the
Southern District. Columbia next moved in the District of Columbia
37 255 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958).
38 Id. at 802.
39 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970).
40 Id. at 1203.
41 See, e.g., Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 552 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir.
1977) which stated:
unless unusual circumstances warrant, the party filing later in time should
be enjoined from further prosecution of his suit. However,. . . the ques-
tion whether an injunction should or should not issue where the parties
were prosecuting distinct actions in different courts was within the discre-
tion of the district court and that any mechanical solution of such
problems [is] not wise judicial administration.
42 525 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
43 Id. at 629.
174 [Vol. 74:167
1988] FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 13(a)
court to enjoin prosecution of the New York cause of action alleging
that Security was required to assert its claim as a compulsory coun-
terclaim in the District of Columbia action. The district court de-
nied the motion on the grounds that the New York action was
commenced first.44 The court of appeals reversed, ruling that Rule
15(c) 45 operated to relate back Columbia's amended complaint to
the original filing date so that "the District of Columbia was the first
jurisdiction in which the issues . .. were raised." 46
The court of appeals acknowledged a "general rule that the
court first acquiring jurisdiction of a controversy should enjoin sub-
sequent proceedings thereon in other jurisdictions, ' 47 but went on
to state: "In our view, however, choice of the forum cannot be suit-
ably made by mechanical application of that principle. The opinions
recognizing the rule have frequently contained a caveat that it
should be ignored under some circumstances." 48 Having rejected
the mechanical solution, the court examined "equitable factors" 49
to determine whether to grant the injunction. The court, however,
did not clearly indicate whether it rejected the first-filed priority rule
entirely or whether it simply recognized the possibility of exceptions
to the rule. If the court intended to abandon the first-filed priority
rule completely, then it would analyze the "equitable factors," with-
out any preference for the initial court acquiring jurisdiction, to de-
termine which of the two courts provided the more convenient and
just forum.50 On the other hand, if the court intended to adopt a
"first-filed priority with exceptions" approach, the court would ana-
lyze the "equitable factors" to determine whether they provided
grounds for an exception to the rule in this particular case.
3. The First Court Decides Rule
Whether courts determine the proper forum by a balancing of
equities test or by the "first-filed priority with exceptions" ap-
proach, the question remains as to which of the two courts having
jurisdiction over the parties should make this determination. In
Donaldson, Luflin &Jenrette, Inc. v. Los Angeles County,51 the court rec-
44 Id. at 626.
45 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) states, in part: "Relation Back of Amend-
ments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading...
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
46 525 F.2d at 626.
47 Id. at 627.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 628. For a discussion of these factors, see infra text accompanying note 94.
50 See infra note 87-107 and accompanying text.
51 542 F. Supp. 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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ognized the importance of this question. In that case, Los Angeles
("LA") had sued Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette ("DLJ") in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California.
DLJ then brought this action, arising out of the same transaction as
LA's California action, in the Southern District of New York. DLJ
moved in the Southern District Court to enjoin LA from prosecut-
ing the California action.52 The Southern District court observed
that in the absence of "special circumstances," the first-filed priority
rule should apply. 53 Without determining whether such special cir-
cumstances were presented, the court focused on the critical issue of
which court should determine whether special circumstances ex-
isted.54 Addressing this issue, the court held that the "district court
hearing the first-filed action should determine whether special cir-
cumstances dictate that the first action be dismissed in favor of a
later-filed action." 55 The court reasoned that such a rule is neces-
sary to avoid "inconsistent rulings on discretionary matters as well
as duplication of judicial effort" and the "possible chaos resulting
from conflicting decisions." 56
B. Methods of Consolidating the Two Suits
When a defendant in a federal suit brings an independent suit
in another federal court on a claim that is subject to Rule 13(a) in
the first suit, the opportunity for the two courts to consolidate the
related disputes can arise in a number of ways. The initial plaintiff
can move in the first court for an injunction preventing further pros-
ecution of the second suit or he can move in the second court for a
dismissal. The initial defendant can move in the second court to
enjoin prosecution of the initial suit or he can more in the first court
for dismissal. Finally, either party can move, in either court, for the
court to transfer the suit before it to the other district court.
1. First Court Enjoins Second Action
To avoid duplicative litigation the court with jurisdiction over
the initial action usually enjoins the prosecution of the later-filed
action.57 In National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler,58 the court of
52 Id. at 1319.
53 Id. at 1320.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1321.
56 Id. (citing the trial transcript). For a summary of a "classic example of one court
ordering proceedings stayed in another court while that very court refused to abate the
same pending action," see Vestal, supra note 16, at 22.
57 For a summary of cases discussing the considerations controlling whether to
grant or deny an injunction enjoining prosecution of another action, see Annotation,
Propriety of Injunction By Federal Court in CivilAction Restraining Prosecution of Later CivilAction
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appeals affirmed the district court's order enjoining prosecution in
another district.5 9 National had brought suit against Fowler and
Thomas in the Eastern District of New York. Prior to trial in that
action, Thomas sued National in the Northern District of Alabama
on a claim concerning the same lease agreement as National's claim.
In the Alabama court, National moved to dismiss or, in the alterna-
tive, to transfer the action to the Eastern District of New York.
When the Alabama court denied these motions, National then
moved in the New York court to enjoin Thomas from further prose-
cution of the Alabama action and to have that action transferred to
the New York court. The district court in New York granted both
motions. 60
On appeal, the court affirmed the district court's issuance of an
injunction but reversed the portion of the district court's order di-
recting that the Alabama case be transferred to the Eastern District
of New York. The court of appeals held first that "the situation was
a perfect one for the issuance of the injunction... "61 In support of
this conclusion, the court stated:
The bulk of authority supports the position that when a case is
brought in one federal district court, and the case so brought em-
braces essentially the same transactions as those in a case pending
in another federal district court, the latter court may enjoin the
suitor in the more recently commenced case from taking any fur-
ther action in the prosecution of that case. 62
Declaring that "the first court to obtain jurisdiction of the parties
and of the issues should have priority over a second court to do so,"
the court viewed the issuance of the injunction as an appropriate
method of protecting the initial court's jurisdiction. 63 The court
next held that the injunction made transfer unnecessary, because it
effectively consolidated the two claims. Once the court enjoined
Thomas from pursuing his claim in the Alabama court, that claim
would either be precluded under Rule 13(a) or the New York court
could grant Thomas leave to amend his answer and include the
claim pursuant to Rule 13(f).64
In Another Federal Court Where One or More Parties or Issues Are, or Allegedly Are, Same, 42
A.L.R. FED. 592 (1979).
58 287 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1961).
59 Id. at 45. See also United Fruit Co. v. Standard Fruit and S.S., 282 F. Supp. 338
(D. Mass. 1968) (granting plaintiff's motion to enjoin defendant from further prosecu-
tion of suit brought in another district on claim that arose out of same transaction as
plaintiff's claim).
60 287 F.2d at 44.
61 Id. at 46.
62 Id. at 45.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 46. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) states: "Omitted Counterclaim.
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2. Second Court Dismisses or Stays Action Before it
Consolidation of two related claims may also be achieved if the
court with jurisdiction over the second-filed action either stays its
own proceedings or dismisses the action before it. For example, in
Semmes Motor, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,65 the court of appeals reversed
the district court's decision not to stay the proceedings before it.66
In that case, Semmes had sued Ford in a New Jersey state court and
Ford had removed the case to the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey. A month later, Semmes brought a "sub-
stantially identical" claim in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. The next day, Ford filed a counter-
claim in the New Jersey action.67 That same day, events occurred
which gave Semmes a new claim arising out of the same transaction
as Ford's counterclaim. This new claim was, accordingly, a compul-
sory counterclaim to Ford's claim in the New Jersey action.68 How-
ever, rather than asserting the new claim as a compulsory
counterclaim in the New Jersey action, Semmes asserted it by
amending its complaint in the New York action. Ford later moved
in the New York court for a stay of proceedings pending determina-
tion of the New Jersey action. The New York court denied the
motion.69
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the "court below went
beyond the allowable bounds of discretion when it refused to grant
Ford's motion for a stay .... 70 The court first stated that under the
circumstances, "the New Jersey court could properly have enjoined
prosecution of the New York action if Ford had sought [an injunc-
tion], and might even have been bound to do so."71 The court then
reasoned that the end result should be the same when "the party
seeking to preserve the primacy of the first court moves the second
court to stay its hand rather than asking the first court to enjoin
prosecution of the second case." 72 Accordingly, the court ruled that
the New York court should enter a stay, provided that Semmes be
When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excus-
able neglect, or when justice requires, the pleader may by leave of court set up the
counterclaim by amendment." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(f).
65 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970).
66 Id. at 1204.
67 Id. at 1200.
68 Id. at 1202. See supra note 29.
69 429 F.2d at 1201.
70 Id. at 1204.
71 Id. at 1202. The court's assertion that the New Jersey court might have been
bound upon a proper motion by Ford to enjoin the prosecution of the New York action
reflects a view that courts should strictly adhere to the first-filed priority rule. See supra
notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
72 429 F.2d at 1202.
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allowed leave to file its claim as a compulsory counterclaim in the
New Jersey action.73
The second court obtaining jurisdiction over the parties can
also consolidate the two actions simply by dismissing the second
suit. In E.J. Korvette Co. v. Parker Pen Co. 74 the court held that Rule
13(a) requires a dismissal of the second suit where the plaintiff's
claim in that suit is the subject of a compulsory counterclaim in a
pending federal action. The court stated that "[s]ince the present
complaint should have been pleaded in the defendant's prior action
against the plaintiffs it must be dismissed, but with leave to them, if
so advised, to assert counterclaims in that action within 30 days after
the entry of an order." 75
Whether the second court orders a stay or a dismissal, it denies
the plaintiff in the second action the opportunity to go forward in
that court. Both solutions accord the first court priority, in effect
telling the plaintiff in the second action to bring his claim as a com-
pulsory counterclaim in the first action. The difference between
these two methods of consolidation is that where the court orders a
stay pending resolution of the initial suit, rather than dismissal, pro-
ceedings in the second suit may resume if the first suit never reaches
judgment.76
3. Second Court Enjoins Prosecution of First Action
Notwithstanding the often rigid application of the first-filed pri-
ority rule,77 the goal of avoiding duplicative litigation does not nec-
essarily require consolidation of the claims in the initial court. The
efficiency concerns of Rule 13(a) can equally be advanced by consol-
idation of the two actions in the second court.
In Sentry Corp. v. Conal International Corp. ,78 the court granted an
injunction enjoining a previously filed suit. The Netherlands Trad-
ing Society ("Netherlands") had sued Sentry Corp. ("Sentry") in
Philadelphia County Court. Two days later, Sentry brought this ac-
tion in the Southern District of New York, against Netherlands and
others, on a claim arising out of the same transaction as Nether-
73 Id. at 1204.
74 17 F.R.D. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
75 Id. at 269. See also United States v. Eastport S.S. Corp., 255 F.2d 795, 802 (2d
Cir. 1958) ("the dismissal... by the District Court was proper even though no judgment
had previously been rendered by the Court of Claims.") discussed supra text accompany-
ing notes 37-38.
76 "A stay of proceedings stops the cause for the period designated in the stay or-
der .... A stay is requested to suspend an action, often because of the pendency of
another proceeding." 9 C. THOMPSON & D.JAKALA, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE
§ 28.01, at 65 (3d ed. 1985).
77 See supra notes 37-40, 71 and accompanying text.
78 164 F. Supp. 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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lands' pending suit.79 Three weeks later, Sentry removed the initial
suit to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania80 and moved in the New York court to enjoin Nether-
lands from prosecuting the Pennsylvania suit. Netherlands filed a
cross motion to dismiss the New York suit "because of a prior action
pending between the said defendant and the plaintiff involving the
same subject matter .. ."81
Citing Rule 13(a), the New York court observed that "each of
the pending suits could properly be asserted as ... [a] counterclaim
in the other." 82 The court then ruled that in such a situation, "the
chronological sequence of the actions should be of secondary im-
portance as compared with the balance of convenience." 8 3 Relying
on the fact that all the parties necessary for full adjudication were
before the court, and that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania might
not have jurisdiction over some parties, the court concluded that the
Southern District of New York was the more appropriate forum.84
Accordingly, the court enjoined prosecution of the Pennsylvania
suit.8 5
4. Either Court Transfers the Suit Before it to the Court Where the
Related Action is Pending
Just as the second court acquiring jurisdiction can serve the
goal of consolidation of the two claims by enjoining the proceedings
in the initial action, the court first obtaining jurisdiction can serve
this goal by transferring the claim before it, pursuant to section
1404 of the Judicial Code, to the court where the defendant has
brought suit on his related claim.8 6 In Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security
National Bank,87 for example, the court recognized the availability of
this option. The Columbia case involved an appeal from the decision
of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in
which the lower court denied a motion to enjoin prosecution of the
second claim filed in the Southern District of New York that alleg-
79 Id. at 772.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 773.
83 Id. at 773-74. This approach seems to illustrate a complete rejection of the first-
filed priority rule as opposed to retaining the rule with exceptions. These two alterna-
tives are discussed supra text accompanying note 50 and infra notes 97-107 and accom-
panying text.
84 164 F. Supp. at 774.
85 Id.
86 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) states in full: "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought."
87 525 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Columbia is discussed supra notes 42-50 and ac-
companying text.
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edly should have been asserted as a compulsory counterclaim in the
District of Columbia action.88 In reversing the district court, the
court of appeals determined that the issues pertaining to the parties'
related claims "were raised" in the District of Columbia action prior
to being raised in the New York action.89 Accordingly, Rule 13(a)
called for "assertion of the New York cause of action as a counter-
claim to the District of Columbia cause of action." 90
This determination, however, did not necessarily mean that the
District of Columbia court should have granted the injunction:
[T]hat only one court should consider the two causes of action
obviously does not ipso facto determine which court should do so.
To be sure, the District of Columbia court could achieve Rule
13(a)'s single-suit objective by restraining Security from going
forward in New York, as the New York court might itself have
done. But the goals underlying Rule 13(a) would likewise be real-
ized should either court transfer the cause of action pending
before it to the other.9'
Not only does the transfer option serve the goals of Rule 13(a) but it
also allows the consolidated action to proceed in the forum "more
convenient to the parties and to the courts, and more consonant
with the overall interests of justice."92 Thus, the court held that
"mechanical application" of the "general rule that the court first ac-
quiring jurisdiction of a controversy should enjoin subsequent pro-
ceedings thereon in other jurisdictions" would be inappropriate. 93
Instead, the decision whether to grant the injunction should turn on
equitable considerations, such as the availability of third parties, the
availability of witnesses, and the relative ability of each court to ex-
peditiously handle the claim. 94 Based on these considerations, the
court concluded that the District of Columbia court was the appro-
priate forum.95
88 Id. at 625-26.
89 Id. at 626.
90 Id at 626-27.
91 Id. at 627 (footnotes omitted). See also Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp.,
552 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1977). After quoting the above passage from Columbia, the court
stated:
In sum, Rule 13(a)'s single-suit objective could have been met by confin-
ing all of the disputes in either the California or the Illinois court. That
the Illinois court first acquired jurisdiction of the controversy, with power
to enjoin subsequent proceedings in another jurisdiction, although enti-
fled to weight, does not necessarily entail the conclusion that it was re-
quired to exercise that power.
Id at 1263.
92 525 F.2d at 627.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 628.
95 Id at 629. Accordingly, the court ordered the district court to enjoin Security
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C. A Proposed Approach: Neutral-Balancing by the First
Court
Although the Columbia case involved somewhat unusual facts,96
such that either court could reasonably claim to have obtained juris-
diction first, the court's reasoning was not limited to that factual sit-
uation. Rather, the court's opinion seems to stand for the general
proposition that, while Rule 13(a) calls for the resolution of related
claims in a single lawsuit, it does not necessarily indicate that the
initial court to obtain jurisdiction over one of the claims is automati-
cally the appropriate forum for that lawsuit. Accordingly, courts
should treat a motion to dismiss or to enjoin the proceedings in the
other action as raising the foundational issue of which court is the
appropriate forum. Without regard to which party made the motion
or in which court the motion was made, the first court to obtain
jurisdiction should balance the equities, as the Columbia court did, to
determine the appropriate forum, and thereby determine whether a
dismissal, injunction, or transfer is appropriate. 97
1. Objections to and Justifications for the Neutral-Balancing
Approach
Under the proposed neutral-balancing approach courts should
resolve the question of which court is the appropriate forum by sim-
ply balancing the interests of the parties without employing any pre-
sumption in favor of the court where the action was initially
brought. As a general approach, this raises several possible objec-
tions. First, the plaintiff's choice of forum is generally entitled to
some weight in determining whether the court should grant a mo-
tion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).98 Moreover, a neutral-
from prosecuting the New York action and to grant Security leave to amend its answer
and include the counterclaim in question.
96 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
97 While a decision to transfer usually follows a motion from one of the parties,
such a motion is not a prerequisite to transfer under section 1404(a). For example, in
Stanley Works v. Globemaster, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Mass. 1975), the court held
that:
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) arms district courts with the broad mandate to trans-
fer a civil action ... when the 'convenience of parties.., or the interest of
justice' require such a course.... [T]he language of the statute leaves
little doubt that it allows transfer on the court's own motion any time the
court determines it is convenient or just for it to do so.
Id. at 1338. See also Lead Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) and
cases cited therein.
98 Thus, where a defendant moves to transfer, he "must make out a strong clear
case." Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 282 F. Supp. 562, 563 (E.D.
Tenn. 1968). For example, in A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., Inc., 365 F.2d 439
(2d Cir. 1966), the court ruled that plaintiff's choice of venue is entitled to substantial
consideration when a motion is made to transfer an action to another district. Id. at 444.
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balancing approach is inconsistent with the first-filed priority rule.99
Traditionally, the burden on the party seeking transfer taken to-
gether with the first-filed priority rule dictated a general presump-
tion in the initial court in favor of enjoining the subsequent action
and against transfer. 10 0
However, there are two major justifications for departing from
the general rule in the compulsory counterclaim situation. First, in
this situation, there are two suits involved, so that both parties are,
in effect, plaintiffs. Thus, both parties are equally entitled to "plain-
tiff's choice of forum." The mere fact that one party filed his claim
first should not deprive the other party of his interest in selecting
the forum for litigation of his claim. 10 The proposed approach en-
sures that both "plaintiffs'" choice of forum is given due weight in
determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, enjoin, or trans-
But cf. Polaroid Corp. v. Casselman, 213 F. Supp. 379, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (plaintiff's
choice of forum "is entitled to no weight whatever where it appears that the plaintiff was
forum shopping and that the selected forum has little or no connection with the parties
or the subject matter."). See also Annotation, Questions as to Convenience and Justice of Trans-
fer Under Forum Non Conveniens Provision of Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)), 1 A.L.R.
FED. 15 (1969) ("A party seeking a transfer under § 1404(a) has the heavy burden of
showing a clear case for transfer.") and cases cited therein.
Nonetheless, the "heavy burden" on a party seeking transfer under section 1404(a)
is not as great as that which courts have traditionally imposed on a party seeking dismis-
sal on the basis of forum non conveniens. The Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) was intended "to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of
inconvenience" than was required under the "old doctrine offorum non conveniens." Nor-
wood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955). The Court further explained: "This is not
to say that the relevant factors have changed or that the plaintiff's choice of forum is not
to be considered, but only that the discretion [of the district court] is broader." Id. In
the leadingforum non conveniens case, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), the
Court summarized those "relevant factors" as including "the private interest of the liti-
gant"; "the relative ease of access to sources of proof"; the "availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses"; the "possibility of view of premises" where appropriate; and "[f]actors of
public interest," including the interest "in having localized controversies decided at
home" and the interest in not imposing jury duty on a "community which has no rela-
tion to the litigation." Id. at 508-09.
99 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
100 Id.
101 Cf. 6A J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, JR., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
57.08 [6.-1] (2d ed. 1987). Professor Moore rejects the first-filed priority rule as applied
to the issue of whether an action in one federal court for a declaratory judgment should
be dismissed where an action involving the same dispute is pending in another federal
court:
The accident of commencement date should not control over the more
practical and realistic factors of convenience of court, witnesses, and par-
ties; the comparative condition of the dockets and, therefore, the relative
ability of the two courts to provide a quick determination of the issues;
the certainty ofjurisdiction .. "
Id. at 57.60 (footnotes omitted). Professor Moore concludes that only if after balanc-
ing the relevant interests the court is unable to determine that one action is superior to
the other, the court should apply the "chronological test." Id. at 57.60-57.62.
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fer because the balancing is neutral-without any presumption in
favor of the first court.
Second, the neutral-balancing approach has the advantage of
avoiding some of the chess match litigation tactics that a first-to-file-
chooses approach would foster. 10 2 Moreover, this approach avoids
the risk of pre-emptive lawsuits. A prospective defendant, anticipat-
ing a lawsuit, may file a weak claim against a possible plaintiff, solely
to force the plaintiff to litigate his strong claim in the defendant's
chosen forum.' 0 3 As long as the first-filing party can frame his
rather frivolous complaint in such a way that it arises out of the same
transaction as the claim he anticipates from his opponent, then he
can choose the court. Not only does this deprive the rightful plain-
tiff of his choice of forum, it produces harassing litigation for both
the court and the party dragged into court to litigate his claim at a
time and place not of his choosing. Thus, in a compulsory counter-
claim situation, a neutral-balancing approach serves the first-filed
priority rule's rationale-avoiding vexatious litigationI04-better
than the first-filed priority rule itself does.
A second possible objection to the neutral-balancing approach
is that, in many cases, the first-filed action will be inherently more
efficient than the second. For example, if the first action has pro-
ceeded significantly further than the second, consolidating the suits
in the first court will involve the least duplication of effort, on behalf
of the court and the parties. The neutral-balancing approach, how-
ever, can incorporate these considerations; the relative stage of the
litigation in the two suits is a factor courts should consider in deter-
mining which forum is more appropriate. 10 5
102 See supra notes 9-26 and accompanying text.
103 See, e.g., Donaldson, Lufkin &Jenrette, Inc. v. Los Angeles County, 542 F. Supp.
1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The plaintiff in this case moved to enjoin a defendant from pros-
ecuting in a prior filed action on the grounds that the defendant "had allegedly brought
the [prior] action solely to secure a California forum in anticipation of claims it knew
would be raised by [the plaintiff] .. ." Id. at 1319-20. Cf Factors, Etc. Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978). In this case, Pro Arts' suit for a declaratory judgment
preceded Factors' suit for injunctive relief concerning the same dispute. The court af-
firmed the district court's refusal to dismiss, stay, or transfer the later-filed suit, partly on
the grounds that "Pro Arts' suit for declaratory judgment was filed in apparent anticipa-
tion of Factors' . . . suit." Id. at 219.
104 See supra text accompanying note 36.
105 Cf Polaroid Corp. v. Casselman, 213 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In declining
to apply the first-filed priority rule when the defendant had sued for a declaratory judg-
ment to resolve his liability shortly before the plaintiff's suit in another district for fraud
arising from the same transactions, the court made the following observation:
[W]eight is given not to inconsequential priority in filing time but to sub-
stantial commitment to the cause, usually pre-trial involvement for many
months, by the court first acquiringjurisdiction. Obviously, a second suit
in such circumstances would cause a wasteful duplication of effort ....
Here... there is no commitment to this cause.
[Vol. 74:167184
1988] FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 13(a)
The third possible objection to the neutral-balancing approach
is that only by giving one court priority over the related lawsuits can
the judicial system avoid conflicting orders from different courts and
the resulting chaos and havoc wreaked upon the judicial system.
The first-filed decides rule, however, avoids the threat of conflicting
orders. 10 6 Thus, under the neutral-balancing approach, the first
court acquiring jurisdiction decides which is the appropriate forum,
but its decision will turn on which court can provide justice in a
more convenient and expeditious manner, rather than on whether
"special circumstances" justify a departure from the first-filed prior-
ity rule.'0 7
A fourth possible objection to the proposed approach is the ar-
gument that such an approach will encourage defendants to violate
Rule 13(a). This argument would reason as follows: If a defendant
files a compulsory counterclaim pursuant to Rule 13(a) in the court
where the initial claim was filed against him, and then moves in that
court to have the entire action transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404,
he will have the burden of showing a clear case in order to overcome
the presumption in favor of plaintiff's choice of forum.10, On the
other hand, if the defendant fails to assert his counterclaim in the
initial court, and instead brings a separate action on the claim in
another court, the neutral-balancing approach would apply. Under
this approach, the initial defendant could obtain a transfer of the
initial action (to the second court), simply by showing that the bal-
ance of the equities favors the second forum.10 9 Thus, the argu-
ment would conclude, the neutral balancing approach provides an
incentive to evade the Rule.
Resolving this apparent difficulty, however, does not require
maintaining the first-filed priority rule in the compulsory counter-
claim situation. Instead, the problem can best be solved by applying
the neutral-balancing approach in all compulsory counterclaim situ-
ations, whether the defendant complies with Rule 13(a) and files his
counterclaim in the initial federal court or he fails to follow the Rule
and brings his claim in a second federal court. Under such an ap-
proach, whenever a defendant properly files a compulsory counter-
claim pursuant to Rule 13(a), and then moves to transfer the entire
action, the court should apply the neutral-balancing approach in de-
ciding on the transfer motion. The same considerations that justify
this approach where the two claims are pending in separate courts
Id. at 381.
106 See, e.g., Donaldson, Lufkin &Jenrette, Inc. v. Los Angeles County, 542 F. Supp.
1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). This case is discussed supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
107 See supra text accompanying note 53.
108 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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apply here. In both situations, both parties have affirmative claims,
and, therefore, both are equally entitled to "plaintiff's choice of
forum." 110
2. An Illustration of the Neutral-Balancing Approach
By rejecting the first-filed priority rule in its traditional form,
and adopting neutral-balancing with a first-filed decides rule, the
federal courts can adopt a consistent and manageable approach to
the situation of related claims pending in different districts, where
one of the claims is subject to Rule 13(a). The following model il-
lustrates how such an approach would work.
In Action 1, A sues B in X Federal District Court. In action 2, B
sues A in Y Federal District Court. Both claims arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence. B brings his claim while Action 1 is
pending. X court is the first court to obtain jurisdiction over the
parties.
First, if A moves in X court to enjoin B from prosecuting Action
2, X court should balance several factors to determine which court
should hear the two claims. Factors should include convenience to
the parties, availability of witnesses to each court, which court would
apply the more appropriate law in light of where the transaction
took place and where the parties reside,11' and whether one of the
110 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
111 A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the conflict of laws doctrine of the
state in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Ac-
cordingly, two district courts will not necessarily apply the same substantive law. Where
the initial court consolidates the two actions by transferring the action before it to the
second court, the choice of law issue becomes even more complicated. The Supreme
Court has held that, as a general rule, when a court transfers an action under section
1404(a), the law that would have governed in the transferor court (X court) should gov-
ern the transferred action in the transferee court (Y court). Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612, 639 (1964) ("A change of venue under § 1404(a) generally should be, with
respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms."). Applying this rule to the compul-
sory counterclaim situation, however, would largely defeat the purpose of Rule 13(a)
because transferee law would apply to the action that was commenced in the transferee
court (action 2), while transferor law would apply to the transferred action (action 1).
This result would be essentially the same as hearing the two actions in two courthouses.
Under these circumstances, an exception to the Van Dusen rule is clearly appropriate, if
not necessary. The Van Dusen opinion itself lends support for such an exception:
[W]e do not and need not consider whether in all cases § 1404(a) would
require the application of the law of the transferor, as opposed to the
transferee, State. We do not attempt to determine whether, for example,
the same considerations would govern if a plaintiff sought transfer under
§ 1404(a) or if it was contended that the transferor state would simply
have dismissed the action on the ground offorum non conveniens.
Id. at 639-40 (footnotes omitted). Cf Lewis v. Capital Mortgage Inv., 78 F.R.D. 295,
312 (D. Md. 1977) ("Although it is generally true that a change of venue under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) does not change any applicable substantive state law, where as here,
the forum state has articulated a strong public policy, conflicts law principles dictate that
the court apply the forum state's law.").
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parties had a better claim to the choice of forum, given the nature of
the two claims and the parties. 1 2 That X court obtained jurisdic-
tion first should not be a factor in determining which is the appro-
priate court.' 1 3
If the balance tips to X court, then X court should enjoin B
from prosecuting Action 2 and allow B leave to amend his answer in
Action 1 to include his counterclaim under Rule 13 (f).114 If the bal-
ance tips to Y court, then X court should deny the motion, and
transfer the case to Y court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 115 Y
court should then consolidate Actions 1 and 2 pursuant to Rule
42(a). 1 6 If transfer under section 1404 is unavailable, 117 then X
court should dismiss the action before it on condition that A is able
to assert his claim as a counterclaim in Action 2. Y court should
allow A leave to amend his answer to Action 2, if necessary.
Second, if A moves in Y court to stay the proceedings, to dis-
miss, or to transfer on the ground that B's claim is a compulsory
counterclaim in Action 1, then Y court should stay the action on
condition that A move for an injunction in X court to enjoin prose-
cution of Action 2. X court will then do the balancing outlined
above. If X court determines that it is the proper forum, then Y
court should dismiss on condition that B is given leave to amend in
X court to assert his compulsory counterclaim.
Third, if A lets the two actions go forward, then B can move in
X court for transfer or dismissal. X court should again do the neu-
tral-balancing of considerations to determine the appropriate court.
Fourth, and finally, if both parties simply allow the two actions
to go forward, the courts may have no knowledge of the other pend-
ing action and, therefore, may be unable to avoid the duplicative
litigation. If, however, the courts are aware of the other pending
action, then X court can raise the Rule 13(a) issue itself and perform
the neutral-balancing to determine the appropriate forum. If X
court determines that Y court is the appropriate forum, then it
112 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
113 See supra notes 10 1-04 and accompanying text.
114 See supra note 64.
115 See supra note 86.
116 See supra note 27.
117 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) allows a district court to transfer an action to "any other
district or division where it might have been brought." The Supreme Court has held
that this language requires that the transferee court would have satisfied the require-
ments of venue and territorial jurisdiction, as to the defendant, at the time the action
was brought, not at the time of the transfer motion. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335
(1960). Thus, if territorial jurisdiction over B or venue as to B would have been im-
proper in Y court, at the time A brought suit in X court, then transfer may not be avail-
able. See Vestal, supra note 16, at 23 (transfer as a means of consolidating related actions
is limited by Hoffman v. Blaski).
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should transfer the suit to Y court"18 or, if transfer is unavailable,
dismiss the suit. 119 If X court determines that it is the appropriate
forum, an injunction against the proceedings in Y court, without a
request for such relief by either party, would be contrary to the na-
ture of the adversary system, and therefore inappropriate. How-
ever, Y court could still dismiss the action before it and force the
whole action into X court.
The neutral-balancing approach consolidates the related claims
into a single litigation, without unduly sacrificing the ability of the
parties to choose a reasonable time and place in which to litigate an
affirmative claim. 120 As a result, the approach promotes Rule
13(a)'s efficiency and fairness goals. 121 The first court to acquire
jurisdiction over the parties retains its priority insofar as it does the
balancing test. This first-filed decides rule avoids the concern of
two district courts issuing conflicting orders. 122 Furthermore, by
determining the appropriate forum based on a neutral-balancing of
interests, this approach avoids the incentives for races to litiga-
tion, 123 and provides a rational and just method for determining the
appropriate forum to hear the consolidated lawsuit. 124
118 Section 1404(a) permits a court to transfer without a motion from a party. See
supra note 97.
119 A federal court has broad discretion in controlling the proceedings in cases
before it:
All courts, federal and state, have a broad and inherent power 'over their
own process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustice'.... Within
this power, is the power of a federal district court, in the exercise of a
sound discretion: to stay an action pending before it; to order a pre-trial
consolidation of actions pending before it ... ; and to give effective relief in
related situations.
1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE supra note 101, at 0.60[6], at 638 (footnotes omitted) (em-
phasis added). See also O'Connell v. Mason, 132 F. 245, 247 (1st Cir. 1904) ("Unques-
tionably, the power to dismiss exists quite independent of express statutory authority,
and may be exercised in a proper case by the court upon its own motion."). Cf Landis v.
North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) ("[T]he power to stay proceedings [in one
action to abide the outcome of another] is incidental to the power inherent in every
court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.").
120 Choice of time is limited, because once either party commences suit, both par-
ties' claims must commence. Under the proposed approach, however, this choice is im-
paired less than where the parties are forced to race to the courthouse. See supra note
103; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 25.
122 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
123 See supra text accompanying note 102.
124 See supra note 101. See also Polaroid Corp. v. Casselman, 213 F. Supp. 379
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). In the course of denying the plaintiff's motion to enjoin a later-filed
action in another district, and granting the defendant's motion to transfer to that dis-
trict, the court stated, "There can be no doubt ... that in deciding whether or not to
enjoin an action in another forum, a court of equity should prefer the forum which offers
effective, convenient, inexpensive, and prompt relief.... The same criteria govern the
decision of whether to transfer the cause under Section 1404(a)." Id. at 382.
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III
SECOND ACTION BROUGHT IN STATE COURT
A defendant in a federal court action with a compulsory coun-
terclaim against a plaintiff may also attempt to evade Rule 13(a) by
bringing the claim in state court. If the state court renders a judg-
ment before the federal court does, then the federal defendant will
have sucessfully avoided the Rule. Indeed, the state court judgment
will probably resolve the pending federal suit through issue preclu-
sion.1 25 Similarly, if the federal court reaches judgment first, it will
resolve the state court action. But whichever court ultimately
renders a judgment, the contemporaneous lawsuits represent the
very problem Rule 13(a) was designed to eliminate: duplicative
litigation.' 26
When a defendant in a federal action brings a claim in state
court that should have been brought as a compulsory counterclaim
in the federal action the problem of consolidating the claims is more
difficult than when the claims are pending in two federal district
courts for two reasons. First, neither court can transfer the action
125 See supra note 19.
126 See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. This problem will only arise, how-
ever, when the state court defendant is unable to remove the case to federal court under
28 U.S.C. § 1441 and then consolidate the two suits following the method outlined in
Part II. Section 1441(a) states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil ac-
tion brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). However, section 1441(b) limits removal of diversity ac-
tions to actions brought against a defendant who is not a citizen of the forum state:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties, or
laws of the United States shall be subject to removal without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be
removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982).
Thus, if federal question jurisdiction exists for the state court suit, or if the plaintiff
sues in a state in which the defendant is not a citizen, the defendant may remove the
action to federal court. The suits can then be consolidated in one of the federal courts.
See, e.g., C. WRIGr & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1418, at 105 ("These same general
principles of transfer, stay, and consolidation also apply when one or both of the actions
before the federal courts were removed from state courts."). See also Columbia Plaza
Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 629 n.64 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (fact that previ-
ously-filed suit, pending in another district court, was removed from state court does not
affect district court's power to enjoin proceedings in that suit).
Where, however, there is only diversity jurisdiction for the suit, and it is brought in
a state in which the defendant has citizenship, removal is not available, and consolidat-
ing the suits will have to involve both the federal and the state courts.
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404.127 Second, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 gener-
ally prohibits the federal courts from enjoining proceedings in a
state court.
12 8
As an alternative to the federal court enjoining the state suit,
the state court might enjoin the suit pending in federal court. While
Rule 13(a) itself clearly would not prompt a state court to enjoin a
federal suit, a similar state court rule, or the "general policy in both
state and federal courts against multiplicity of litigation,"'129 might
justify an injunction. The Supreme Court, however, has made clear
that a state court's power to enjoin federal proceedings is even more
limited than a federal court's power to enjoin state proceedings.13 0
A. The Prohibition Against a Federal Court Enjoining
Proceedings in a State Court
Although section 2283 allows a federal court to enjoin state
court proceedings if "expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments,"' 13' the courts have held that none of these excep-
tions applies to the Rule 13(a) situation.
In Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corp. ,132 Reines sued Admi-
ral in federal court. Thereafter, Admiral brought related claims
against Reines in New York state court and also asserted these
claims as compulsory counterclaims in the federal court. Reines
moved in the state court for a stay, and the state court denied the
motion. Reines then moved in the federal court for an order en-
joining Admiral from further prosecuting the state court action. Re-
lying on section 2283, the federal court denied the motion. 133 The
127 Section 1404 provides only for interdistrict transfer (i.e., between two federal
district courts). See supra note 86. There is no comparable provision for transfer be-
tween judicial systems.
128 28 U.S.C. § 2283 provides: "Stay of State court proceedings. A court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
129 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1418, at 108.
130 See Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964) ("state courts are completely
without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions").
131 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
132 182 F. Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
133 Id. at 231. The result may be different, however, where the second action is
brought in a court of a foreign country. In Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat'l
Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1981), the defendant brought suit in a Canadian
court on a claim that was a compulsory counterclaim in the federal action. Affirming the
district court's injunction restraining the defendant from prosecuting in the Canadian
court, the court noted that "[i]t is well-settled that in order to enforce... [Rule 13(a)], a
federal court may enjoin a party from bringing its compulsory counterclaim in a subse-
quentfederal court action." Id. at 854 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, "[a] federal
... court with jurisdiction over the parties has the power to enjoin them from proceed-
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court held that none of the exceptions to section 2283 applied to
this situation.134 Citing the reviser's notes to the Act, the court
ruled that the "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception simply made
"clear the recognized power of the federal court to stay proceedings
in state courts in cases removed to the district courts."'135 The "pro-
tect or effectuate its judgments" exception operated only to allow
courts to "prevent a party from relitigating in the state court issues
already foreclosed by a federal judgment."' 3 6 The court further
reasoned that where the state court has concurrent jurisdiction over
the claims, "the fact that such [compulsory] counterclaims must be
pleaded cannot oust the state court of jurisdiction."'137 As to
whether Rule 13(a) amounted to an express authorization to enjoin
state courts, the court held that "the words 'expressly authorized by
Act of Congress' could not encompass the directive contained in the
compulsory counterclaim rule."' 38 Moreover, the court viewed
Rule 13(a) as "simply a federal court housekeeping rule to expedite
the courts' business," which "could not possibly qualify as an excep-
tion" to section 2283.13 9
ing with an action in the courts of a foreign country .... Id.,at 855. See also Note, The
Power of a Federal District Court to Enjoin An Action, Grounded on a Compulsory Counterclaim, in
the Court of a Foreign Country, 2 CANqADuN-Am. L.J. 211 (1984).
134 182 F. Supp. at 228.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 228-29. This "protect and effectuate its judgments" exception may allow a
federal court to enjoin a party from prosecuting in a state court a claim that should have
been asserted as a compulsory counterclaim in a federal action that has already reached
judgment. See, e.g., Brown v. McCormick, 608 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1979) (affirming dis-
trict court's injunction against suit in state court involving a compulsory counterclaim to
a federal suit that had already reached judgment).
137 182 F. Supp. at 229.
138 Id.
139 Id at 230. See also Fantecchi v. Gross, 158 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1957), appeal
dismissed, 255 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1958). In that case, the court denied plaintiff's motion to
stay defendant's state court action which arose out of the same transaction as plaintiff's
claim in the federal action. The court stated:
[I]nsofar as the effect of a party's failure to plead a compulsory counter-
claim under said Rule in a Federal action is concerned the Congressional
intent is clear-said party is thereafter barred from pleading same. ...
However, insofar as the effect of such failure on a State court action is
concerned the Congressional intent is not so clear; thus, in the absence of
clearer expression than is contained in Rule 13(a) we are unwilling to say
that Congress... intended to grant Federal Courts the authority to en-
join State Court actions ....
Id. at 687. See also Red Top Trucking Corp. v. Seaboard Freight Lines, Inc., 35 F. Supp.
740 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (Rule 13(a) does not provide federal court with authority to enjoin C
state court proceedings); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1418, at 106 ("Clearly
the language of Rule 13(a) cannot be construed as empowering the federal court to
restrain state court proceedings .... In this situation the general objective underlying
Rule 13(a) of avoiding multiple suits is outweighed by the express statutory policy
prohibiting federal interference with the functioning of state judicial system.") (foot-
notes omitted).
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B. The Federal Defendant's Interest in Access to a State Court
Because Rule 13(a) does not govern state courts, a state court
may choose to adjudicate a party's claim, despite the fact that the
claim is the subject of a compulsory counterclaim in a pending fed-
eral action. For example, in M.C. Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Texas
Foundries, Inc.,140 a Texas court ruled that because Rule 13(a) does
not empower a federal court to enjoin a state court action, a state
court should not abate its own proceedings when faced with a claim
that is the proper subject of a compulsory counterclaim in a pending
federal suit. M.C. Manufacturing had sued Texas Foundries in fed-
eral court. While that action was pending, Texas Foundries filed
suit against M.C. Manufacturing in a Texas state court. The state
court defendant, M.C. Manufacturing, sought abatement of the state
court action on the ground that Texas Foundries' claim was a com-
pulsory counterclaim in the pending federal action. 141 On appeal
from a state court judgment for Texas Foundries, the court affirmed
the trial court's denial of the plea. In reaching this conclusion, the
court stated:
We have not . . . found a case directly in point. Apparently, the
approach taken in other cases was to attempt to secure an order
enjoining the prosecution of the state court case, rather than a
[request for abatement]. However, we see no reason why the
same rules should not be applied to both types of cases. 142
The M.C. Manufacturing Co. court rested its decision solely on
the fact that the federal court with jurisdiction over the parties
lacked the power to enjoin the state court. The court's rationale-
ensuring that the same rule applies regardless of which court the
state court defendant seeks relief from-seems insufficient to justify
ignoring the policies of Rule 13(a). Nonetheless, allowing the state
court action to go forward despite the presence of a related action
pending in federal court may serve broader policy interests.
For example, the state court, as part of an independent judicial
system of general jurisdiction, may have an interest in providing liti-
140 519 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
141 Id. at 270.
142 Id. But see McDonald's Corp. v. Levine, 108 Ill. App. 3d 732, 439 N.E.2d 475
(1982). In holding that Rule 13(a) does apply to a claim brought in a state court that
should have been asserted as a compulsory counterclaim in a pending federal action, the
court observed:
It has been held that a Federal court may not enjoin prosecution in a
State court of what should have been a compulsory counterclaim in a
pending Federal action, but this is because of the general reluctance of
Federal courts to enjoin State actions. These cases do not suggest that
the States are free to disregard the failure of the pleader to put forward
his Federal counterclaim.
Id. at 747, 439 N.E.2d at 485. See also infra note 144 and accompanying text.
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gants with equal access to its courts. Thus, in Dixie Ohio Express Co. v.
Eagle Express Co.,143 a Kentucky court decided not to enforce Rule
13(a) on the theory that the parties had a right to sue in either state
or federal court. Eagle had sued Dixie in federal court. While that
action was pending, Dixie brought a claim in Kentucky state court
arising out of the same transaction as Eagle's claim. Despite the fact
that Kentucky's "Civil Rule 13.01 [was] identical with and ex-
presse[d] the same policy as the Federal Rule," the court held that
"Dixie was not barred from suing... in the Kentucky courts by the
mere fact that there was an action pending in the federal court in
which, under the Federal Rules, Dixie's claim should have been as-
serted as a counterclaim."' 144 The court's decision rested on notions
of federalism, such as the interest in allowing claimants to choose a
state forum rather than a federal forum. Relying on the "accepted
rule... that a person may bring actions in both a federal and a state
court on the same claim," the court declared that because "aplaintiff
may sue in both courts on this claim... a defendant [should not] be
restricted on his claim . . . in the action first brought against
him."145
C. Advancing Rule 13(a)'s Policy On Grounds of Comity
Although the state courts are not bound by Rule 13(a), state
courts sometimes recognize the Rule and cooperate so as to achieve
the goal of efficient resolution of related claims. As the court in
Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corp. 146 noted, despite its decision
to deny an injunction against a state court proceedings, "[t]he state
courts are free to recognize the federal policy and grant a stay on
the basis of comity."'147
The South Carolina Supreme Court did just that in Sparrow v.
Nerzig.148 In holding that the state court should stay the proceed-
ings before it, the court stated that the "assumption of jurisdiction
by our court of a cause of action essentially the subject of a compul-
143 346 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961).
144 Id. at 33.
145 Id. (emphasis in original). See also Hubbs v. Nichols, 201 Tenn. 304, 298 S.W.2d
801 (1956) (failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim in pending federal action does
not preclude a state court from hearing that claim).
146 182 F. Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
147 Id. at 230. See also C. WRIGirr & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1418, at 108:
Despite the fact that the federal court may not enjoin a state proceeding
based on a federal compulsory counterclaim, the state court, although it
is not required to do so, may well stay its proceedings on its own in order
to effectuate the general policy in both state and federal courts against
multiplicity of litigation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
148 228 S.C. 277, 89 S.E.2d 718 (1955).
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sory counterclaim in the pending federal action [would] unnecessa-
rily hinder the jurisdiction of the district court and effectually defeat
the purpose of [Rule 13(a)]." 149 Allowing the South Carolina court
to hear the claim would therefore, conflict with the "'spirit of re-
ciprocal comity and mutual assistance' required for the effective op-
eration of our two systems of courts."' 50
In Conrad v. West,151 a California appellate court took the spirit
of comity even further than the Sparrow court did. In Conrad, the
plaintiff brought his state action while the defendant had a claim
against him pending in federal court. The state court defendant
moved to stay the proceedings pending resolution of the federal ac-
tion. The state court granted the motion, reasoning that the plain-
tiff "could have filed [his claim as] a counterclaim in the federal
court action. .." and the federal court would then have had jurisdic-
tion over the claim. 152 Furthermore, the court observed that, as a
general rule, the first court obtaining jurisdiction holds it to the ex-
clusion of all other courts. 155 Although the two claims arose out of
same transaction,' 54 the court's holding seems equally applicable to
permissive counterclaims. 155 Because the federal rules allow a de-
fendant to assert any claim against an opposing party, the reasoning
in Conrad suggests that the Texas court would stay proceedings
before it any time another lawsuit between the same parties is pend-
ing in a federal district court that could obtain jurisdiction over the
action brought in the state court.
D. A Proposed Approach
Resolving the problem that arises when the federal court de-
149 Id. at 287, 89 S.E.2d at 722.
150 Id. See also McDonald's Corp. v. Levine, 108 I1. App. 3d 732, 439 N.E.2d 475
(1982), in which the court held that the federal "compulsory counterclaim rule is appli-
cable even though state law has no such requirement." Id. at 746, 439 N.E.2d at 487.
Cf Chapman v. Aetna Fin. Co., 615 F.2d 361, 363-64 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that while
"Georgia's compulsory counterclaim rule ... would not ordinarily be entitled to full
faith and credit in foreign jurisdictions," the rule should apply in federal court "as a
matter of comity."). See also Dumbauld, Judicial Interference with Litigation in Other Courts,
74 DICK. L. REv. 369, 383 (1970) ("[TMhe mere existence of a dual system of courts
imposes a certain circumspection on the actions of both sets of courts in order to avoid
unseemly friction, and to ensure the effective functioning of both sets of courts.").
151 98 Cal. App. 2d 116, 219 P.2d 477 (1950).
152 Id. at 118, 219 P.2d at 478.
153 Id. Cf the discussion of the first-filed priority rule supra notes 34-40 and accom-
panying text.
154 98 Cal. App.2d at 117, 219 P.2d at 478.
155 A defendant to a federal action may assert in that action any non-compulsory
counterclaims against the plaintiff under Rule 13(b). The Rule states: "Permissive
Counterclaims. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing
party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
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fendant brings suit on his compulsory counterclaim in a state court
requires consideration of the appropriate courses for both the state
and the federal court. The federal court could consolidate the re-
lated actions by abating the action pending in its court and allowing
the entire action to go forward in the state court. Unlike the situa-
tion where both cases are pending in federal courts, however, such
an action would deprive the initial plaintiff of his right to bring his
claim in a federal court.1 56 The interest in providing a federal fo-
rum would seem to outweigh the Rule 13(a) concerns. As a result,
where one of the two related suits is pending in state court, unlike
where they are both pending in federal court, the two suits will not
always be consolidated.
The sharp contrast between the approach of the Dixie and M. C.
Manufacturing Co. courts 57 and that of the Sparrow and Conrad
courts' 58 reveals that, as in the exclusively federal court situation,
there are competing interests involved in a decision to stay or dis-
miss the state court action. The interest in providing litigants with
access to a state court' 59 suggests allowing the state action to go
forward. On the other hand, the federal court's interest in avoiding
duplicative litigation and the associated problems 60 suggests abat-
156 Chief Justice Marshall's often quoted statement presents a rationale for such a
right:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will adminis-
ter justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every descrip-
tion, it is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains
apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible
fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribu-
nals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or be-
tween citizens of different states.
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87 (5 Granch 1809). See also Donovan v.
Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964), where, in holding that the "state courts are completely
without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions," the Court
observed that parties "properly in the federal court ha[ve] a right granted by Congress
to have the court decide the issues they present[] .... That right was granted by Con-
gress and cannot be taken away by the State." Id. at 413; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260
U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (Congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction creates "the un-
doubted right under the statute to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court and that
court... [is] bound to take the case and proceed to judgment. It... [can] not abdicate
its authority or duty in favor of the state jurisdiction.").
157 See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
159 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. See also Efros v. Nationwide Corp., 12
Ohio St. 3d 191, 465 N.E.2d 1309 (1984). In that case, the court observed that while a
court could properly dismiss a suit on the basis of a prior action pending in a court of
the same state, "[w]here the same action is filed in federal court and state court, entirely
different policy considerations arise .... Id. at 193, 465 N.E.2d at 1311. Accordingly,
under these circumstances, dismissal was inappropriate. The important distinction, in
the court's view, was that in the latter situation, "each court answers to a separate and
independent sovereign." Id.
160 See supra notes 5-26 and accompanying text.
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ing the state court action. But where the federal defendant brings a
second suit in state court, it is the state's judicial resources, rather
than federal resources, that will be expended on the duplicative liti-
gation. Under these circumstances, Rule 13(a) seems to be of only
secondary consideration. 16 Of course, the "general policy in both
state and federal courts against multiplicity of litigation"' 62 would
still be implicated. Moreover, the presence of the two related law-
suits may create races to litigation, in which the plaintiff in each
court attempts to obtain its judgment first so that he can rely on
issue preclusion in defending the other suit.163
These considerations might suggest that the state court should
use a neutral-balancing approach similar to that proposed for the
exclusively federal court situation. 164 However, such an approach
would be highly unfair to the federal court defendant, in light of the
general rule that a plaintiff may bring suit on the same claim against
the same party in both a federal and a state court.1 65 As the
Supreme Court has observed, "[t]he rule.., has become generally
established that where the action first brought is in personam and
seeks only a personal judgment, another action for the same cause
in anotherjurisdiction is not precluded."' 66 Thus, state courts com-
monly entertain suits despite the presence of a prior action pending
in another jurisdiction concerning the same claim and the same par-
ties. 167 Courts apparently do not view the problem of duplicative
161 Cf Reines Distribs., Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 182 F. Supp. 226, 230 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (Rule 13(a) is "simply a federal court housekeeping rule to expedite the court's
business.").
162 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 1418, at 108.
163 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 96-124 and accompanying text.
165 See, e.g., Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. Eagle Express Co., 346 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1961) ("If aplaintiff may sue in both courts on his claim, why should a defendant be
restricted on his claim in the action first brought against him?") (emphasis in original).
166 Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922). See also Princess Lida v.
Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939) ("it is settled that where the judgment sought is
strictly in personam, both the state court and the federal court, having concurrent juris-
diction, may proceed with the litigation"); IA MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcrncE supra note
101, at 0.208b, at 2350 ("Where the federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdic-
tion, as for example, in diversity and general federal question cases, actions in personam
may proceed concurrently") (footnotes omitted).
167 See, e.g., Efros v. Nationwide Corp., 12 Ohio St. 3d 191,465 N.E.2d 1309 (1984),
in which the Ohio Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the com-
plaint on the basis of a pending action in federal court. The court reasoned:
The federal rule . . . provides that the pendency of a prior in personam
action in federal court does not bar the same suit between the same par-
ties in a state court. Applying this rule to the instant cause, we conclude
that appellee's action should have been permitted to proceed to a final
judgment in the ... [state court], regardless of the pendency of the simi-
lar action in the federal district court, and regardless of which court first
acquired jurisdiction. The dismissal ... was therefore improper.
Id. at 193, 465 N.E.2d at 1311. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceed-
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litigation in this context as a sufficient concern to preclude the sec-
ond suit. To adopt a contrary rule for state court suits, where the
claim is a compulsory counterclaim to a suit pending in federal
court, would force the federal court defendant to litigate his claim in
the court chosen by the initial plaintiff. Thus, while a party can usu-
ally litigate his claim in at least two courts of his choosing, a party
whose claim is subject to Rule 13(a) would be allowed to litigate his
claim only in a court that he did not choose.
Accordingly, as a general rule, the independent state court ac-
tion should be allowed to go forward, just as it is where the same
plaintiff brings both the federal and state court actions. Instances
may arise in which the state court plaintiff has chosen such an incon-
venient forum, with such minimal ties to the dispute and the parties,
that the state court should decide to abate its proceedings in favor
of the federal proceedings. Whether such circumstances exist in a
particular case should be a matter for the state court to decide,
based on the significance of the particular state's interest in allowing
access to its courts.
CONCLUSION
The basic purpose behind Rule 13(a)-avoiding wasteful, re-
petitive litigation-generally calls for the resolution of claims arising
out of the same transaction or occurrence in a single lawsuit. Thus,
where two such claims are simultaneously proceeding in different
federal district courts, the courts should take steps to consolidate
the actions, using the tools of interdistrict injunction or transfer.
The courts can effectuate the Rule's efficiency concerns by consoli-
dating the actions in either of the two courts; in this sense, Rule
13(a) is forum-neutral. Determination of the appropriate forum
should turn on considerations of general efficiency and fairness to
the parties, rather than on the accident of which court first obtained
jurisdiction over the parties. This neutral-balancing approach ad-
vances the purposes of the Rule with the minimum encroachment
on the relative interests of each party in choosing the time and place
in which to litigate his claim.
Rule 13(a)'s single-suit objective is also implicated where a fed-
eral defendant brings suit on his compulsory counterclaim in a state
ings. Id. See also Fowler v. Ross, 142 Cal. App. 3d 472, 477, 191 Cal. Rptr. 183, 186
(1983) ("Under the facts of this case, both the federal and state courts have acquired
jurisdiction but neither acquires exclusive authority and each may proceed at its own
pace until one or the other reaches final judgment .. "); Goehring v. Harleysville Mut.
Casualty Co., 460 Pa. 138, 143, 331 A.2d 457, 459 (1975) ("[N]either court is divested
ofjurisdiction by the mere fact that another action involving the same dispute is pending
in the other.").
198 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:167
court. In this situation, however, the competing interests in al-
lowing access to the independent state judicial system and allowing
access to a federal forum may counsel against consolidation of the
actions. Nonetheless, where the party bringing the state court ac-
tion does not have any legitimate interest in adjudicating his claim
in the state court, rather than in the federal court, consolidation may
be appropriate. Under such circumstances, the state court should,
as a matter of comity, recognize the policy embodied in Rule 13(a),
and dismiss the claim.
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